Patch this week:Argo CD: Repo-Server RCE and AppProject Bypass (Oct 2026). Teams running Argo CD 2.x or 3.x, most urgently multi-tenant installs where developers, tenants or CI bots can push to tracked Git repos, hold Application get, or manage repositories.
Check exposure:GhostAction. Maintainers and organizations whose repositories, including forks and mirrors, received an injected 'Security Audit' or 'Github Actions Security' workflow since August 31, 2026, and anyone whose GitHub token or password may sit in infostealer logs.
npm: 8 critical advisories (flowise, flowise-components, @payloadcms/plugin-form-builder, quasar, vm2, @backstage/plugin-scaffolder-backend, payload). Check with npm audit (or: npm ls <package>).
PyPI: 2 critical advisories (langflow, langflow-base, lfx, PraisonAI). Check with pip-audit (or: pip show <package>).
Go: 2 critical advisories (github.com/sipcapture/homer-app). Check with govulncheck ./....
None of it touches your stack? Then there is nothing to do today. That is a result, not a failure to read carefully.
Upgrade Argo CD to a patched 3.3, 3.4 or 3.5 release this week, and today on shared instances where people you do not fully trust can push to tracked repos or merely view an Application.
Must act: Teams running Argo CD 2.x or 3.x, most urgently multi-tenant installs where developers, tenants or CI bots can push to tracked Git repos, hold Application get, or manage repositories.
Can relax: Single-team installs where only platform admins can push to tracked repos and use the Argo CD API carry less risk, but should still upgrade on a normal short cycle.
Check the running version on every Argo CD instance and upgrade to 3.3.15, 3.4.10, 3.5.4 or 3.6.0-rc2; move 2.x and 3.0-3.2 to a supported line.
Until upgraded, set jsonnet.enable to "false" in argocd-cm if you do not use Jsonnet, and remove --enable-helm from kustomize.buildOptions if you do not render Helm through Kustomize.
Restrict Git write access to repos backing restricted AppProjects, and limit who can delete Applications, create or update repositories, and call the API with Application get.
If any repository you own or contribute to gained a security-audit.yml or github_actions_security.yml workflow you did not write, treat its Actions secrets, every credential ever committed to it, and the pushing account as compromised.
Must act: Maintainers and organizations whose repositories, including forks and mirrors, received an injected 'Security Audit' or 'Github Actions Security' workflow since August 31, 2026, and anyone whose GitHub token or password may sit in infostealer logs.
Can relax: Repositories with no such workflow in any branch, and organizations that already require approval for workflow runs and block direct pushes to .github/workflows; GitHub has been stopping the October payload from running since October 9.
Search every branch of your repositories and forks for security-audit.yml, github_actions_security.yml and security-check.yml, and for the string 193.32.204.199.
If found, revoke the GitHub credential that pushed it (PATs, OAuth grants, SSH keys, sessions) and re-enroll the account with phishing-resistant MFA.
Rotate every Actions secret named in the workflow and every credential ever committed to the repository, including ones deleted from history.
Payload Form Builder has an RCE issueCVE-2026-105857CVSS 10.0 Critical @payloadcms/plugin-form-builder < 3.90.0 → fixed in 3.90.0; @payloadcms/plugin-form-builder >= 4.0.0-canary.0, < 4.0.0-canary.34 → fixed in 4.0.0-canary.34