Act now:REDCap CVE-2026-90817: Exploited Unauthenticated RCE. Universities, hospitals and research groups that host their own REDCap server, especially any that publish public surveys on the internet, including department- or lab-run instances outside central IT.
Patch this week:nginx2root. Anyone running NGINX Open Source 1.9.5 to 1.31.8 or NGINX Plus with HTTP/2 enabled on a reachable listener, especially internet-facing reverse proxies and container images built on older nginx bases.
Patch this week:Ruby2Shell. Teams running Rails (other than API-only apps), classic-style Sinatra or other Rack apps on Ruby before 3.3.14, 3.4.13 or 4.0.10, and admins of products that bundle Ruby, such as GitHub Enterprise Server, GitLab, Mastodon, OpenProject, Chatwoot and Discourse.
Check exposure:F5 BIG-IP: Six Critical iRule and APM Overflows Hotfixed. BIG-IP 17.1, 17.5 and 21.1 and BIG-IP Next for Kubernetes or CNF administrators whose virtual servers run iRules using PEM::subscriber, MR::message route, PSC::ip_address, GENERICMESSAGE::route or DNS::scrape, or APM per-request policies with Client Information and Endpoint Security agents.
Do you run any of these? Vanderbilt University Research Electronic Data Capture (REDCap), Apache Axis, BerriAI LiteLLM, Synology DiskStation Manager (DSM). They are being exploited in the wild (CISA KEV). Patch or mitigate if you do; CISA’s federal deadline is 2026-11-21.
crates.io (Rust): 1 critical advisory (atomic-server). Check with cargo audit.
Go: 1 critical advisory (miren.dev/runtime). Check with govulncheck ./....
A public exploit gets code execution in a lab and the last nginx bug like this was attacked within three days, but no attacks are reported yet and turning off HTTP/2 blocks the main bug, so patch internet-facing HTTP/2 servers in the next few days and use the workaround where no package exists.
Must act: Anyone running NGINX Open Source 1.9.5 to 1.31.8 or NGINX Plus with HTTP/2 enabled on a reachable listener, especially internet-facing reverse proxies and container images built on older nginx bases.
Can relax: Servers already running 1.30.7, 1.31.9 or a fixed distribution package after a full restart, and nginx instances that only speak HTTP/1.1 behind a CDN or load balancer that terminates HTTP/2.
Find every nginx that accepts HTTP/2: run nginx -v and nginx -T | grep -nE 'http2|http3|quic|resolver|mirror|auth_http' on each host and image.
Upgrade to nginx 1.30.7 or 1.31.9, NGINX Plus 37.0.8.1 or 37.3.0.1, or your distribution's fixed package, then fully restart nginx; a reload does not replace the running binary.
Rebuild container images from the refreshed nginx:1.30.7 or nginx:1.31.9 official images or a fixed distro base, and redeploy.
Upgrade Ruby on every server and image before November 25, when a remote exploit for stock Rails is due to go public: the trigger needs no login in default Rails, but turning it into code execution is hard and nobody has been seen doing it.
Must act: Teams running Rails (other than API-only apps), classic-style Sinatra or other Rack apps on Ruby before 3.3.14, 3.4.13 or 4.0.10, and admins of products that bundle Ruby, such as GitHub Enterprise Server, GitLab, Mastodon, OpenProject, Chatwoot and Discourse.
Can relax: GitLab.com users, since GitLab says it has already remediated the service, and developers who only run Ruby locally for scripts that never change the case of untrusted text; they can upgrade on their normal schedule.
Inventory every Ruby interpreter on servers, CI runners, workers and container images with ruby -v, and check each app's running version with bin/rails runner 'puts RUBY_DESCRIPTION'.
Upgrade to Ruby 4.0.10, 3.4.13 or 3.3.14 and update the version pins in .ruby-version, .tool-versions and the Gemfile ruby line.
Rebuild container images from fixed base tags such as ruby:3.4.13, redeploy, and restart every Puma, Unicorn and Sidekiq process.
If you run REDCap 13.3.0 or later below 16.0.49, 17.3.10 or 17.4.4, upgrade today: the only precondition is a public survey link, the fix has existed since September, and CISA now lists the flaw as exploited.
Must act: Universities, hospitals and research groups that host their own REDCap server, especially any that publish public surveys on the internet, including department- or lab-run instances outside central IT.
Can relax: Researchers and survey participants who use an institution's REDCap without running the server, and instances already on 16.0.49, 17.3.10, 17.4.4 or later.
Inventory every REDCap server you run, including department and lab instances, and check each version on the Control Center home page.
Upgrade to 17.4.4, 17.3.10, 16.0.49 or later and complete the database upgrade step; servers on other release lines must move to one of these.
If you cannot upgrade today, disable public surveys and block survey-context requests to the root dispatcher, DataImportController and ParcelController as temporary containment.
Search your iRules and APM per-request policies today; if any virtual server matches one of the six named configurations, install F5's engineering hotfix this week, because F5 lists no workaround and attackers have moved fast on BIG-IP bugs before.
Must act: BIG-IP 17.1, 17.5 and 21.1 and BIG-IP Next for Kubernetes or CNF administrators whose virtual servers run iRules using PEM::subscriber, MR::message route, PSC::ip_address, GENERICMESSAGE::route or DNS::scrape, or APM per-request policies with Client Information and Endpoint Security agents.
Can relax: BIG-IP sites that use none of those iRule commands or APM agent combinations: the critical flaws do not reach them, the management plane is not exposed, and only the lower-rated APM crash bugs may still apply.
Record the version and provisioned modules on every BIG-IP, standby units included, with tmsh show sys version and tmsh list sys provision.
Search all partitions for the vulnerable iRule commands with grep -nE 'PEM::subscriber|MR::message +route|PSC::ip_address|GENERICMESSAGE::route|DNS::scrape' /config/bigip.conf /config/partitions/*/bigip.conf.
On APM systems, check every per-request policy for a Client Information agent combined with Endpoint Security agents, and list SAML SP access profiles and per-request policies with a form-based Logon Page.
Vanderbilt University Research Electronic Data Capture (REDCap) Vanderbilt University Research Electronic Data Capture (REDCap) Code Injection Vulnerability