Security Digest · Nov 9, 2026 · Supply-chain compromise · Library

bee-js 13.3.0: npm Release Drops Wallet Stealer and Backdoor

@ethersphere/bee-js 13.3.0 ran a postinstall payload that stole Swarm wallet files and set up remote access. Pulled from npm; pin 13.2.0 and check installs.

Our verdict

Check exposure

This is a small package and the bad version is already gone from npm, so most teams have nothing to do, but any machine or CI job that installed 13.3.0 with lifecycle scripts enabled should be treated as compromised.

Who must act: Anyone whose lockfiles, caches, mirrors or CI logs show @ethersphere/bee-js 13.3.0, including through swarm-cli, bee-dashboard or Swarm Desktop builds that resolved a fresh ^13 range on or after November 9, 2026.

Who can relax: Projects that do not depend on bee-js, and projects whose lockfile pinned 13.2.0 or earlier with no fresh resolution during the window, are not affected.

Affected
@ethersphere/bee-js 13.3.0
Fixed in
13.3.0 removed from npm; latest points to 13.2.0 as of 2026-11-09
CVSS
Not scored
EPSS
n/a
CISA KEV
Not listed
Exploitation
Exploited in the wild
Severity
High

What to do

  1. Search lockfiles, internal mirrors, caches and CI logs for @ethersphere/bee-js 13.3.0, including transitive installs.
  2. Pin a reviewed release with npm install @ethersphere/bee-js@13.2.0 --save-exact and regenerate lockfiles that resolved 13.3.0.
  3. If 13.3.0 installed with lifecycle scripts enabled, isolate the host, preserve evidence and rebuild it from a trusted image, because removing the package does not remove the persistence.
  4. From a clean machine, rotate every credential the affected user or CI job could reach.
  5. If Swarm Desktop wallet files were present, treat swarm.key and any password in config.yaml as exposed and move funds to a new wallet.

How to check if you are affected or compromised

  • Check the dependency tree: npm ls @ethersphere/bee-js --all.
  • Search DNS, proxy and firewall logs for api.frameworkmetrics[.]xyz, including the paths /v1/analytics, /v1/assets/ and /v1/swarm/report.
  • On Linux look for ~/.solidity/ and ~/.config/systemd/user/solidity-langsupport-runner.service; on macOS look for ~/.solidity/ and ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.solidity.langsupport.runner.plist.
  • On Windows look for %TEMP%\.stuffed-*, %LOCALAPPDATA%\.<32-hex-guid>\app.msi and new Microsoft Defender exclusions.

What happened#

On November 9, 2026, at 00:09:50 UTC, @ethersphere/bee-js version 13.3.0 was published to npm with code that runs at install time. bee-js is the JavaScript client for Swarm, a decentralized storage network. StepSecurity's analysis found that the release moved a script into postinstall, so the code runs on npm install even if nothing ever imports the library.

The script requests JavaScript from api.frameworkmetrics[.]xyz, a domain registered on November 6, and executes the response. The payload looks for Swarm Desktop's config.yaml and data-dir/keys/swarm.key and uploads both if present. The keystore is encrypted, but config.yaml may hold its password. The payload then tries to establish persistence: a systemd user service on Linux, a LaunchAgent on macOS, and on Windows a silent MSI install with a Microsoft Defender exclusion. StepSecurity's static analysis suggests the Linux binary provides remote command execution, but runtime behavior was not verified, and the macOS executable and the Windows MSI were not retrieved.

The malicious commit was pushed directly to the upcoming branch under the bee-worker release identity at 23:59:54 UTC on November 8. A GitHub release at 00:06:01 UTC then triggered the normal publishing workflow. That means the package carries valid SLSA provenance: the attestation correctly says the legitimate workflow built it, and says nothing about whether the source was legitimate. StepSecurity says the evidence points to a stolen credential or token for that identity, but which one and how it was obtained have not been established.

Who is affected#

Only version 13.3.0 is affected. StepSecurity examined 13.2.0 and found no malicious install path. It also lists dependents whose ranges allowed 13.3.0 on a fresh resolution: @ethersphere/swarm-cli 3.7.0 (^13.2.0), @ethersphere/bee-dashboard 0.37.1 (^13.0.0) and the swarm-desktop repository (^13.0.0). The report does not claim those projects contain injected code themselves.

Do you really need to act?#

Probably not, unless you work with Swarm. The package is small, with 3,496 downloads across all versions from November 2 to 8, before the bad release. The npm registry no longer lists 13.3.0 and latest points to 13.2.0, so a new install today will not fetch it. When it was removed is not disclosed as of November 9. StepSecurity recorded it still tagged latest at 00:31 UTC, and the registry record was last modified at 01:24:58 UTC.

If you did install it, take it seriously. Lifecycle scripts were the trigger, the request suppresses errors and times out after three seconds, so a clean install log proves nothing. The number of affected installs and any wallet losses are not disclosed. The project's GitHub issue showed no maintainer statement when we read it on November 9.

What to do now#

  1. Run npm ls @ethersphere/bee-js --all and search lockfiles, internal mirrors and CI logs for 13.3.0.
  2. Pin a reviewed version: npm install @ethersphere/bee-js@13.2.0 --save-exact.
  3. If 13.3.0 installed with lifecycle scripts enabled, isolate the host, keep evidence and rebuild it. Deleting node_modules does not remove installed services or LaunchAgents.
  4. Rotate credentials the user or CI job could reach, working from a clean machine.
  5. Replace any Swarm wallet whose files were on that machine.
  6. Consider npm config set ignore-scripts true for CI jobs that do not need install scripts. It stops this class of hook but does not undo a past run.

How to tell if you were hit#

Check DNS and proxy logs for api.frameworkmetrics[.]xyz. On Linux look for ~/.solidity/ and ~/.config/systemd/user/solidity-langsupport-runner.service. On macOS look for ~/.solidity/ and ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.solidity.langsupport.runner.plist. On Windows look for %TEMP%\.stuffed-* and an app.msi under a hidden GUID-named folder in %LOCALAPPDATA%. StepSecurity also published SHA-256 hashes for the Linux binaries. Absence of these files does not clear a host if the payload changed between requests, since the server decides what each install receives.

Timeline#

  • — api.frameworkmetrics[.]xyz registered at 15:08 UTC.
  • — Malicious commit pushed to the upcoming branch at 23:59:54 UTC.
  • — GitHub release at 00:06:01 UTC and npm publish at 00:09:50 UTC. StepSecurity reports the compromise, and 13.3.0 is later removed from npm.

Sources

Original sources first: vendor and project advisories, CVE and government records, the discoverers’ write-ups. Every claim above links to one of these. See how the Security Desk works.

Original and primary sources

  1. StepSecurity — @ethersphere/bee-js 13.3.0 Compromised stepsecurity.io
  2. ethersphere/bee-js — Issue #1294: npm package version 13.3.0 is compromised github.com
  3. npm registry — @ethersphere/bee-js package metadata registry.npmjs.org
  4. npm — download counts for @ethersphere/bee-js, last week api.npmjs.org