---
title: "Optimizely Web Script Hijack Hit 178 Organizations"
url: https://erroneo.us/security/briefs/optimizely-web-experimentation-script-hijack-optimjack/
description: "Attackers injected a crypto clipper, card skimmer and iOS exploit loader into Optimizely Web snippets on Nov 16. Cleaned; customers must audit."
type: security-brief
section: "Security Digest"
date_published: 2026-11-16
date_modified: 2026-11-17
publisher: erroneo.us
author: erroneo.us Security Desk
verdict: "Check exposure"
cves: []
severity: "high"
exploited: "in-the-wild"
kev: false
license: All rights reserved. Quote with attribution and a link.
---

# Optimizely Web Script Hijack Hit 178 Organizations

**Verdict: Check exposure.** If your site loads an Optimizely Web snippet, assume it may have served malware to visitors on November 16 and audit today; everyone else has nothing to patch.

- **Who must act:** Teams whose sites load an Optimizely Web Experimentation snippet, above all those that take card details in their own forms, show crypto addresses, or keep session tokens in cookies without HttpOnly.
- **Who can relax:** Sites that do not use Optimizely Web; the injected code was removed by late November 16 UTC and the payload domain no longer resolves.
- **Affected:** Optimizely Web Experimentation projects whose Project JavaScript was modified on Nov 16, 2026: 188 snippets across 178 organizations found by Report URI, likely an undercount; Visitors to those sites between about 04:00 and 21:00 UTC on Nov 16, 2026; iPhones and iPads on iOS 18.6 or earlier that visited those sites after about 17:13 UTC
- **Fixed:** Optimizely says it fixed the vulnerability and removed the injected code (status notice, Nov 17, 2026, 01:02 UTC); Report URI found all infected snippets clean by Nov 16, 23:11 UTC; No customer-side patch exists; cleanup is an audit of projects, access and exposed data
- **CVEs:** none
- **CISA KEV:** no · **Exploitation:** Exploited in the wild

## What to do

1. Open every Optimizely Web project and read the Project JavaScript and each experiment's custom code; search for 1688360, atob( and eval, and remove anything you did not write.
2. Fetch each snippet you serve, including self-hosted copies, and search it for 1688360, .icu and track.js.
3. Search DNS, proxy and CSP report logs from 04:00 UTC Nov 16 for 1688360.cc and the listed .icu domains to learn whether your visitors were served the payload.
4. Review Optimizely users, API tokens and integrations, remove any you do not recognize, rotate the rest, and ask Optimizely which of your projects changed and when.
5. If your own forms took card details on Nov 16, treat those cards as exposed and involve your payment and compliance contacts; rotate session tokens stored in cookies without HttpOnly.
6. Move card entry into your payment provider's cross-origin hosted fields and keep third-party tags off checkout pages.
7. Deploy a Content Security Policy with restrictive script-src and connect-src, without unsafe-eval where possible, and turn on reporting.

### How to check if you are affected

- In Optimizely Web, the Project JavaScript field contains a script tag for 1688360.cc/track.js, a base64 string decoded with atob(), or a large inline block run through eval.
- Run curl -s https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/YOUR_PROJECT_ID.js | grep -cE '1688360|\.icu|track\.js' against every snippet; it should print 0 now, so rely on logs for Nov 16.
- DNS, proxy or CSP logs show requests to 1688360.cc (paths /track.js, /hit.php, /card.php) or to 5vobauua3ojpklx.icu and eil786npto9u5bq.icu between 04:00 and 21:00 UTC on Nov 16.
- In a browser session from that day: window._k7 is defined, or sessionStorage holds keys beginning cc_.

## What happened

On November 16, 2026, an attacker wrote malicious JavaScript into customer projects on Optimizely Web Experimentation, the A/B testing service many large sites load on every page. Optimizely's [status notice](https://status.optimizely.com/incidents/ftw0fh9wx43z), posted at 01:02 UTC on November 17, says "an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation" to add the code to some customer projects, and that the flaw is fixed and the code removed. A statement quoted by [BleepingComputer](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/optimizely-supply-chain-attack-delivers-malware-to-cnn-fox-news-bbc-salesforce-sites/) places the flaw in the Experimentation account signup flow. No CVE has been assigned, and Optimizely has not explained how one flaw gave write access to many unrelated customers.

Scott Helme of [Report URI](https://blog.report-uri.com/worlds-largest-brands-infected-with-malware-via-optimizely/) found the campaign. The attacker's loader sat in each project's Project JavaScript field, which runs on every page that loads the snippet. The rest of the snippet was untouched, and it was still served from `cdn.optimizely.com` with Optimizely's certificate. Of 1,611 snippets Helme checked, 188 were infected, belonging to 178 organizations, including the BBC, CNN, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC and Optimizely's own site and login page. He expects the real number to be higher.

The loader pulled `track.js` from `1688360.cc`. According to Report URI and [StepSecurity](https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/optimjack-optimizely-hosted-scripts-crypto-clipper-card-skimmer), which calls the campaign OPTIMJACK, the payload did four things:

- **Swapped cryptocurrency addresses** in page text, forms, the clipboard and outgoing requests.
- **Skimmed payment cards** (number, expiry, CVV) from the site's own form fields, from 13:43 UTC.
- **Sent cookies and a screenshot** to the attacker after a visible address swap. HttpOnly cookies were out of reach.
- **Loaded iOS exploit kits** on iPhones and iPads from two `.icu` domains, with a hidden iframe added for iOS 18.6 and earlier from about 17:13 UTC.

## Who is affected

Two groups. First, organizations whose Optimizely Web projects were modified. Report URI's post lists the 178 it found, and Optimizely says it has notified affected customers. Sites that serve the snippet from their own domain were hit too, because the content comes from the same project. Second, people who visited those sites between roughly 04:00 and 21:00 UTC on November 16.

A site on the list delivered the code to browsers. That does not mean its servers or databases were breached, a point [Cynet](https://www.cynet.com/blog/optimjack-malicious-web-injection-across-cnn-zoom-salesforce-fox-and-more/) makes explicitly.

## Do you really need to act?

**If you do not use Optimizely Web, no.** There is nothing to patch, the injected code is gone, and the payload domain was put on registry hold at 00:37 UTC on November 17.

**If you do, yes, today**, and the work is an audit, not an upgrade. The measured damage so far is small: attacker wallets received about $7,150 by Report URI's count, and some of that predates the attack. The limits of the payload matter too. The skimmer could not read card fields inside cross-origin payment iframes such as Stripe's or Adyen's hosted fields. Cookies were sent only after an address swap on a page with payment wording, so most visitors sent none. Cynet, which used an emulated iPhone, says its evidence shows conditional delivery of the iOS stage, not a compromised device, and Report URI confirmed no iPhone takeovers. The kit's own comments mark iOS 18.7.3 and later, and iOS 26.3 and later, as patched.

What is not known: how many cards were captured, how the attacker reached so many accounts, and whether that access is fully closed. Smartsheet's snippet was cleaned and then re-infected with an obfuscated loader during the day.

The broader lesson applies to any third-party tag. Report URI checked the affected sites' Content Security Policies: 68 had none, 50 had one that let the payload run and send data out, and only 24 blocked it. Allowing `cdn.optimizely.com` gave no protection, since the malicious code came from that host.

## What to do now

1. Open every Optimizely Web project and read the Project JavaScript and each experiment's custom code. Search for `1688360`, `atob(` and `eval`. One loader variant hid the domain in base64, and another carried a full inline copy of the payload.
2. Check what you serve now: `curl -s https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/YOUR_PROJECT_ID.js | grep -cE '1688360|\.icu|track\.js'`. Do the same for any self-hosted copy.
3. Search DNS, proxy and CSP report logs from 04:00 UTC on November 16 for `1688360.cc`, `5vobauua3ojpklx.icu` and `eil786npto9u5bq.icu`.
4. Review Optimizely users, API tokens and integrations. Remove what you do not recognize, rotate the rest, and ask Optimizely which of your project IDs changed, when and through which account.
5. If your own forms accepted card details that day, treat them as exposed and bring in your payment and compliance contacts. Rotate session tokens kept in cookies without HttpOnly.
6. Move card entry into your payment provider's cross-origin hosted fields, and keep third-party tags off checkout pages.
7. Deploy a CSP with restrictive `script-src` and `connect-src`, avoid `'unsafe-eval'` where you can, and enable reporting.

Cynet advises against blocking `cdn.optimizely.com` or the affected sites. Block the attacker's domains only.

## How to tell if you were hit

As a site owner, the evidence is a changed Project JavaScript field and log entries for the attacker's hosts. The paths to look for on `1688360.cc` are `/track.js`, `/hit.php` and `/card.php`. The domain pointed to `136.113.106.136`. The payload was rebuilt 26 times during the day, so do not rely on one hash. The final build's SHA-256 is `f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40`. Report URI kept copies of every infected snippet with timestamps and will share them with affected organizations.

As a visitor to an affected site on November 16: compare any crypto payment you made with the address you meant to pay, watch your statement if you typed a card into the site, and update iPhones and iPads to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later.

## Timeline

- Nov 16, 2026 — 04:21 UTC: first injection seen, in a BBC snippet. 08:10: first build of `track.js`. 13:43: card skimmer added. 17:13–17:57: iOS exploit iframe added. About 20:40: mass cleanup begins. 23:11: all snippets Report URI tracked are clean.
- Nov 17, 2026 — 00:37 UTC: `1688360.cc` put on registry hold. 01:02: Optimizely posts its incident notice. Attacker wallets are emptied during the morning.

## Sources

1. [Optimizely — Web Experimentation Security Incident (status notice)](https://status.optimizely.com/incidents/ftw0fh9wx43z)
2. [Report URI (Scott Helme) — World's largest brands infected with malware via Optimizely](https://blog.report-uri.com/worlds-largest-brands-infected-with-malware-via-optimizely/)
3. [StepSecurity — OPTIMJACK: Optimizely-hosted scripts served a crypto clipper and card skimmer](https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/optimjack-optimizely-hosted-scripts-crypto-clipper-card-skimmer)
4. [Cynet — OPTIMJACK: malicious web injection across CNN, Zoom, Salesforce, Fox and more](https://www.cynet.com/blog/optimjack-malicious-web-injection-across-cnn-zoom-salesforce-fox-and-more/)
5. [BleepingComputer — Optimizely hack infected CNN, Fox News, BBC, Salesforce sites with malware](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/optimizely-supply-chain-attack-delivers-malware-to-cnn-fox-news-bbc-salesforce-sites/)
6. [The Hacker News — Hijacked Optimizely Scripts Served Card Skimmer and iOS Exploit Kits to CNN, BBC and Zoom Visitors](https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/hijacked-optimizely-scripts-served-card.html)

---
Source page: https://erroneo.us/security/briefs/optimizely-web-experimentation-script-hijack-optimjack/ · Security Digest: https://erroneo.us/security/ · More: https://erroneo.us/llms.txt
