---
title: "Puppet CVE-2026-115731: Exploited RCE via Agent Reports"
url: https://erroneo.us/security/briefs/puppet-server-report-deserialization-rce-cve-2026-115731-kev/
description: "Any agent certificate can run code on Puppet or OpenVox Server through a crafted report. In CISA KEV Nov 17. Fixed in PE 2026.0.1, 2025.12.1, 2023.8.13."
type: security-brief
section: "Security Digest"
date_published: 2026-11-17
date_modified: 2026-11-20
publisher: erroneo.us
author: erroneo.us Security Desk
verdict: "Act now"
cves: ["CVE-2026-115731"]
severity: "critical"
exploited: "in-the-wild"
kev: true
license: All rights reserved. Quote with attribution and a link.
---

# Puppet CVE-2026-115731: Exploited RCE via Agent Reports

**Verdict: Act now.** Patch Puppet and OpenVox servers now and turn off loose autosigning: CISA lists the flaw as exploited, a public proof of concept exists, and one compromised node is enough to take the server that controls your whole fleet.

- **Who must act:** Anyone running Puppet Enterprise, Puppet Core, OpenVox Server or legacy open-source Puppet Server, and Red Hat Satellite admins using its Puppet features, most urgently where autosign is on or port 8140 is reachable from untrusted networks.
- **Who can relax:** Organizations that do not use Puppet or OpenVox, and servers already on the fixed releases with strict certificate signing and no signs of earlier compromise.
- **Affected:** Puppet Enterprise 2023.8.x before 2023.8.13; Puppet Enterprise 2025.x before 2025.12.1; Puppet Enterprise 2026.0.x before 2026.0.1; Puppet Core before 8.22.2 and 9.1.3; OpenVox Server 8.17.0 and earlier, 9.1.0 and earlier; OpenVox Agent 8.31.1 and earlier, 9.2.0 and earlier; Legacy open-source Puppet (no fix planned)
- **Fixed:** Puppet Enterprise 2026.0.1, 2025.12.1, 2023.8.13; Puppet Core 9.1.3, 8.22.2; OpenVox Server 9.2.0, 8.18.0; OpenVox Agent 9.3.0, 8.32.0
- **CVEs:** CVE-2026-115731
- **CISA KEV:** yes · **Exploitation:** Exploited in the wild

## What to do

1. Upgrade Puppet Enterprise to 2026.0.1, 2025.12.1 or 2023.8.13, Puppet Core to 9.1.3 or 8.22.2, or OpenVox to server 9.2.0 or 8.18.0 with agent 9.3.0 or 8.32.0 on the server host.
2. Check autosigning with puppet config print autosign --section server and disable it, or replace it with policy-based signing that verifies each request.
3. Allow port 8140 on the server only from networks where managed nodes actually live.
4. Review signed certificates with puppetserver ca list --all and revoke any you cannot account for.
5. If the server may have been compromised, treat the CA key and all code it pushed as untrusted and plan a CA rebuild with incident response.
6. Move any legacy open-source Puppet servers to OpenVox or Puppet Core, because they will not receive a fix.

### How to check if you are affected

- Search the Puppet Server access log (/var/log/puppetlabs/puppetserver/puppetserver-access.log) for PUT /puppet/v3/report requests from unknown certnames or addresses.
- Look in EDR or auditd data for shells, curl or wget started by the puppet service user or the Puppet Server JVM.
- If reports are stored, grep the report directory for the exploit marker: grep -rl RubyMethod "$(puppet config print reportdir --section server)".
- Compare puppetserver ca list --all against your inventory for certificates signed since November 3, 2026 that match no real host.

## What happened

In a coordinated release on November 3, 2026, Perforce and the OpenVox project disclosed [CVE-2026-115731](https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-115731), a deserialization flaw in the code Puppet Server uses to process agent reports. After each run, an agent sends the server a JSON report with a PUT request to `/puppet/v3/report`. According to the [OpenVox advisory](https://github.com/OpenVoxProject/openvox/security/advisories/GHSA-ffr6-rwpm-p5wq), the events in that report are passed to Puppet's rich-data deserializer. The deserializer honors an attacker-supplied `__ptype`. A crafted Object type with a `RubyMethod` annotation ends up in `class_eval`, and the attacker's code runs on the server as the Puppet service user. The advisory includes a complete proof-of-concept report.

Perforce, the CNA, scores it 9.4 under CVSS 4.0. Red Hat and NVD score it 9.9 under CVSS 3.1, with scope changed. On November 17, CISA [added it](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/11/17/cisa-adds-one-known-exploited-vulnerability-catalog) to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, based on evidence of active exploitation, with a federal deadline of December 1.

## Who is affected

The [Perforce advisory](https://portal.perforce.com/s/cve/a91Qi000003IaHpIAK/report-deserialization-code-execution) and CVE record list Puppet Enterprise 2023.8.x before 2023.8.13, 2025.x before 2025.12.1 and 2026.0.x before 2026.0.1. [Security Affairs](https://securityaffairs.com/203377/hacking/u-s-cisa-adds-perforce-puppet-enterprise-flaw-to-its-known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog.html) reports that Puppet Core is fixed in 9.1.3 and 8.22.2. OpenVox fixed it in server 9.2.0 and 8.18.0 and in agent 9.3.0 and 8.32.0. The vulnerable code ships in the agent package, which the server also loads, so update both on the server host.

[Vox Pupuli](https://voxpupuli.org/blog/2026/11/03/critical-cve-updates/) says all known Puppet implementations are vulnerable and that legacy open-source Puppet will not get more updates, security or otherwise. [Red Hat](https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2026-115731) notes that in Satellite, the affected service processes client reports over the network by default.

## Do you really need to act?

**Yes, if you run a Puppet or OpenVox server.** The attacker needs a certificate signed by your Puppet CA, and in a well-run fleet that sounds like a high bar. It is not. Every managed node holds such a certificate, so root on any one managed node is enough to attack the server. If autosigning accepts requests without real verification, the attacker can simply request a certificate and needs no foothold at all.

The server is the worst place to lose. Red Hat says exploitation can compromise the central certificate authority and every downstream managed system. An attacker on the Puppet server can push code that agents run, usually as root, across the whole fleet.

Public detail on the attacks is thin. CISA has not described them, and Security Affairs reports that Perforce said it was not aware of attacks. Still, the KEV listing, the public proof of concept and more than two weeks of available patches leave little reason to wait.

## What to do now

1. Check what you run: `rpm -qa | grep -Ei 'puppet|openvox'` or `dpkg -l | grep -Ei 'puppet|openvox'`. On Puppet Enterprise, also check `/opt/puppetlabs/server/pe_version`.
2. Upgrade to the fixed releases above, including the agent package on the server host.
3. Run `puppet config print autosign --section server`. If it returns `true`, or points to an `autosign.conf` with broad globs, disable it or switch to policy-based signing.
4. Limit port 8140 to the networks where your nodes live.
5. Run `puppetserver ca list --all` and revoke certificates you cannot tie to a real host.
6. Move legacy open-source Puppet servers to OpenVox or Puppet Core.

## How to tell if you were hit

Search `/var/log/puppetlabs/puppetserver/puppetserver-access.log` for `PUT /puppet/v3/report` requests from certnames or addresses you do not recognize, especially since November 3. In EDR or auditd data, look for shells, `curl` or `wget` started by the Puppet service user or the Puppet Server JVM. If the store report processor is on, `grep -rl RubyMethod "$(puppet config print reportdir --section server)"` may find the exploit payload. Normal reports should not contain that string. If you find evidence, patching is not enough. Treat the CA private key as stolen, review recent code and Hiera changes that were deployed, and plan a CA rebuild with your incident response team.

## Timeline

- Oct 2026 — A Neodyme researcher reports the flaw to the OpenVox project in mid-October.
- Nov 3, 2026 — Coordinated release: Perforce fixes Puppet Enterprise and Puppet Core, OpenVox ships fixed packages, and the CVE and the GitHub advisory with its proof of concept are published.
- Nov 17, 2026 — CISA adds CVE-2026-115731 to the KEV catalog, with a federal deadline of December 1, 2026.

## Sources

1. [CVE record — CVE-2026-115731 (Perforce)](https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-115731)
2. [Perforce — Report Deserialization Code Execution (CVE-2026-115731)](https://portal.perforce.com/s/cve/a91Qi000003IaHpIAK/report-deserialization-code-execution)
3. [OpenVox — GHSA-ffr6-rwpm-p5wq: Authenticated RCE on OpenVox server via Event Deserialization](https://github.com/OpenVoxProject/openvox/security/advisories/GHSA-ffr6-rwpm-p5wq)
4. [Vox Pupuli — Critical CVE Updates in all known versions of Puppet and OpenVox](https://voxpupuli.org/blog/2026/11/03/critical-cve-updates/)
5. [CISA — CISA Adds One Known Exploited Vulnerability to Catalog (Nov 17, 2026)](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/11/17/cisa-adds-one-known-exploited-vulnerability-catalog)
6. [CISA — Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog entry for CVE-2026-115731](https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-115731)
7. [Red Hat — CVE-2026-115731](https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2026-115731)
8. [Security Affairs — U.S. CISA adds Perforce Puppet Enterprise flaw to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog](https://securityaffairs.com/203377/hacking/u-s-cisa-adds-perforce-puppet-enterprise-flaw-to-its-known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog.html)

---
Source page: https://erroneo.us/security/briefs/puppet-server-report-deserialization-rce-cve-2026-115731-kev/ · Security Digest: https://erroneo.us/security/ · More: https://erroneo.us/llms.txt
