---
title: "Qubole AWS Role Abuse: Customer Secrets and S3 Stolen"
url: https://erroneo.us/security/briefs/qubole-aws-cross-account-role-abuse/
description: "Attackers used Qubole's AWS credentials to assume customer IAM roles Oct 14-26, taking secrets and S3 data. Check for roles trusting account 805246085872."
type: security-brief
section: "Security Digest"
date_published: 2026-11-09
date_modified: 2026-11-11
publisher: erroneo.us
author: erroneo.us Security Desk
verdict: "Check exposure"
cves: []
severity: "high"
exploited: "in-the-wild"
kev: false
license: All rights reserved. Quote with attribution and a link.
---

# Qubole AWS Role Abuse: Customer Secrets and S3 Stolen

**Verdict: Check exposure.** If any of your AWS accounts has an IAM role that trusts Qubole's account, treat it as possibly used by an attacker and check CloudTrail today; if none does, this incident does not touch you, but the same weakness applies to every vendor role you have.

- **Who must act:** Current and former Qubole customers on AWS whose accounts still contain an IAM role trusting account 805246085872, or IAM access keys created for a Qubole integration.
- **Who can relax:** AWS users who never integrated Qubole and have no role trusting that account. AWS itself was not compromised.
- **Affected:** AWS accounts with an IAM role whose trust policy allows Qubole's account 805246085872; AWS accounts with customer-owned IAM access keys created for Qubole integrations (separate Oct 8-11 activity)
- **Fixed:** No vendor fix or statement from Qubole as of Nov 11, 2026; remove or restrict the trust yourself
- **CVEs:** none
- **CISA KEV:** no · **Exploitation:** Exploited in the wild

## What to do

1. List IAM roles in every account whose trust policy names account 805246085872, and find any access keys created for Qubole.
2. Search CloudTrail from October 1, 2026 for AssumeRole events from that account that came from non-AWS IP addresses.
3. If you no longer use Qubole, delete the roles and keys. If you do, narrow the trust policy to a specific principal and add an aws:SourceIp condition.
4. If a role was assumed by the attacker, rotate every secret, parameter and Lambda environment variable it could read, and revoke the role's active sessions.
5. Preserve CloudTrail and S3 access logs for October before they expire.
6. Inventory every other IAM role that trusts an external account and remove the unused ones.

### How to check if you are affected

- CloudTrail AssumeRole events where userIdentity.accountId is 805246085872 and the source IP is not an AWS address, or where principalId is AIDA3W7DIFLYOLTK63SFS.
- Role session names beginning with quiam-, such as quiam-enum or quiam-scope-full.
- Activity from 57.129.54.120, 45.83.220.211, 185.209.199.73, 89.37.63.175 or 2001:41d0:70d:7800::. The Mullvad addresses are shared VPN exits and are not conclusive alone.
- GetCallerIdentity calls or identity provider sign-ins with a TruffleHog user agent between October 16 and 19.
- After any matching session: GetSecretValue, GetParameter, GetFunctionConfiguration and S3 ListBuckets followed by GetObject.

## What happened

On November 9, 2026, [Wiz](https://www.wiz.io/blog/qubole-cross-account-access-abused-in-the-wild) and [Sentra](https://sentra.io/blog/breaches/inside-the-qubole-supply-chain-attack) published reports on an attacker who entered customer AWS environments through Qubole, a cloud data processing platform. Mandiant also took part in the investigation.

Qubole's platform reaches into customer accounts in the standard way: the customer creates an IAM role that trusts Qubole's AWS account, 805246085872, and Qubole calls `sts:AssumeRole` to get temporary credentials. Between October 14 and 26, an attacker holding IAM user credentials from that Qubole account made the same calls. Wiz reports that every request included the External ID and every request succeeded.

Inside each account the attacker listed resources, then collected credentials: Secrets Manager values, SSM Parameter Store parameters, Lambda environment variables and, per Sentra, EC2 user data. They checked the stolen AWS keys, Microsoft Entra ID client secrets and Okta client credentials with TruffleHog, and downloaded S3 data, in some cases whole buckets in one session. Sentra saw about 100 passwords and keys read in seven minutes, millions of files taken from one company, and no write actions at all.

Wiz also describes separate activity from October 8 to 11 that used customer-owned access keys believed to have been created for Qubole integrations. It could not link the two.

How Qubole's credentials were obtained is not disclosed as of November 11, 2026. [BleepingComputer](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-exploit-trusted-aws-access-to-breach-multiple-cloud-environments/) found no public statement from Qubole. AWS told the outlet its services "were not compromised by this issue and operated as designed."

## Who is affected

Organizations with an IAM role that trusts account 805246085872. Wiz refers to "multiple victim AWS environments," Sentra to more than a dozen breached organizations, and BleepingComputer to tens of companies. No list of victims is public.

Former customers are squarely in scope. Wiz found that in most affected environments the attacker's requests were the only `AssumeRole` activity from the vendor account in October. Sentra describes roles that had been dormant since spring. The integration was no longer in use, but the role and its permissions were still there.

## Do you really need to act?

**Only if the trust exists in your accounts, and that takes minutes to check.** Most AWS users never used Qubole and have nothing to do for this incident.

If you do have such a role, assume it may have been used. The External ID did not help: it is logged in plaintext in CloudTrail and Wiz advises against relying on it as the only control. The attacker was opportunistic and took whatever each role could read, so the damage depends on the role's permissions. A role with broad S3 read and access to Secrets Manager means your secrets and data may be gone, and those secrets may open systems outside AWS.

The wider lesson applies to everyone. Any role that trusts a vendor's account is as safe as that vendor's credentials. Both reports state that a source IP condition on the trust policy would have blocked every observed assumption.

## What to do now

1. Find the roles, in every account: `aws iam list-roles --query "Roles[?contains(to_string(AssumeRolePolicyDocument), '805246085872')].RoleName" --output text`
2. Search CloudTrail, in each region you use and in us-east-1: `aws cloudtrail lookup-events --lookup-attributes AttributeKey=EventName,AttributeValue=AssumeRole --start-time 2026-10-01 --query "Events[?contains(CloudTrailEvent, '805246085872')].CloudTrailEvent" --output text`. An organization trail queried with Athena or CloudTrail Lake is better if you have one.
3. If you no longer use Qubole, delete the role and any Qubole access keys.
4. If you still use it, replace the account-wide `:root` principal with the specific vendor principal, add an `aws:SourceIp` or `aws:SourceVpce` condition, and cut the role's permissions to what the integration needs.
5. If the attacker assumed the role, rotate every secret it could read and use "Revoke active sessions" on the role in the IAM console. Wiz notes that rotating a credential does not end sessions already issued.
6. Turn on S3 data events or server access logs for sensitive buckets. Management events do not record object reads.

## How to tell if you were hit

Wiz published indicators. Review CloudTrail from October 1, 2026 for:

- `AssumeRole` where `userIdentity.accountId` is `805246085872` and the source IP is not an AWS address.
- `AssumeRole` where `userIdentity.principalId` is `AIDA3W7DIFLYOLTK63SFS`, seen only in attacker activity, or `AIDAJYRRH5Y3A7AAJM2HW` from a non-AWS address. The second ID also appears in legitimate Qubole traffic.
- Role session names starting with `quiam-`.
- Source addresses `57.129.54.120` and `2001:41d0:70d:7800::` (OVH), and the Mullvad exits `45.83.220.211`, `185.209.199.73` and `89.37.63.175`. Shared VPN addresses are not proof alone.
- `GetCallerIdentity` with a TruffleHog user agent, and the same user agent in Entra ID or Okta sign-in logs.

For each session you find, list what followed, especially `GetSecretValue`, `GetParameter`, `GetFunctionConfiguration` and S3 `GetObject`. That list is your rotation and notification scope.

## Timeline

- Oct 8, 2026 — Separate activity begins using customer-owned access keys tied to Qubole integrations. It runs to October 11.
- Oct 14, 2026 — First `AssumeRole` calls from the Qubole account by the attacker, from a Mullvad VPN address.
- Oct 15, 2026 — Most activity moves to an OVH server.
- Oct 26, 2026 — Last observed activity. The trust policies remain in place.
- Nov 9, 2026 — Wiz and Sentra publish their reports.
- Nov 11, 2026 — AWS statement reported by BleepingComputer. No public statement from Qubole.

## Sources

1. [Wiz — Trusted by Default: Qubole Cross-Account Access Abused in the Wild](https://www.wiz.io/blog/qubole-cross-account-access-abused-in-the-wild)
2. [Sentra — Inside the Qubole Supply Chain Attack](https://sentra.io/blog/breaches/inside-the-qubole-supply-chain-attack)
3. [BleepingComputer — Hackers exploit trusted AWS access to breach multiple cloud environments](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-exploit-trusted-aws-access-to-breach-multiple-cloud-environments/)

---
Source page: https://erroneo.us/security/briefs/qubole-aws-cross-account-role-abuse/ · Security Digest: https://erroneo.us/security/ · More: https://erroneo.us/llms.txt
