CVE-2026-29080: Rucio has SQL Injection in FilterEngine Oracle JSON Path via DID Search API

Should you act?

Critical, preconditions apply

Severe if exploited, but exploitation needs conditions that may not apply to you. This signal is computed from CISA KEV, EPSS and CVSS data; it is not an editorial verdict.

• No confirmed exploitation. It is not in CISA’s KEV catalog and CISA’s SSVC assessment records no known exploitation. That can change quickly after a public write-up; re-check if you are affected.
• EPSS 0.5%, percentile 43: FIRST’s model estimates a 0.5% chance of exploitation activity in the next 30 days, higher than 43% of all scored CVEs (low). EPSS is a probability, not a verdict.
• Needs an account (low (any account)). Exposure depends on who can log in.
• Only applies if your dependency tree includes rucio (PyPI) >= 1.27.0, < 35.8.5, fixed in 35.8.5; rucio (PyPI) >= 36.0.0, < 38.5.5, fixed in 38.5.5; rucio (PyPI) >= 39.0.0, < 39.4.2, fixed in 39.4.2; rucio (PyPI) >= 40.0.0, < 40.1.1, fixed in 40.1.1. Check your lockfile, including transitive dependencies.

What it is

A SQL injection vulnerability in FilterEngine.createsqlaquery() allows any authenticated Rucio user to execute arbitrary SQL against the backend database through the DID search endpoint (GET /dids/ /dids/search). On Oracle deployments attacker-controlled filter keys and values are interpolated directly into sqlalchemy.text() via Python .format(), completely bypassing parameterization. This enables full database compromise including extraction of authentication tokens, password hashes, and all managed data identifiers. This affects versions 1.27.0 and later before 35.8.5, 38.5.5, 39.4.2, and 40.1.1. The vulnerability exists in lib/rucio/core/didmetaplugins/filterengine.py within the createsqlaquery() method. When the database dialect is Oracle, filter expressions for JSON metadata columns are constructed using text() with Python string formatting. Both key and value are attacker-controlled strings derived from HTTP query parameters. The text() function creates a raw SQL fragment — it does not escape or parameterize its contents. Any authenticated Rucio user can exploit this through the DID search API to execute arbitrary SQL against the backend database. This can expose all managed data identifiers and sensitive tables such as identities, tokens, accounts, rsesettings, and rules, and may allow modification of database contents. The issue affects Oracle deployments using the default jsonmeta plugin and does not affect PostgreSQL or MySQL deployments using that plugin. This vulnerability has been fixed in versions 35.8.5, 38.5.5, 39.4.2, and 40.1.1.

From the GitHub advisory

Summary

A SQL injection vulnerability in the Oracle path of FilterEngine.createsqlaquery allows any authenticated Rucio user to execute arbitrary SQL against the backend database through the DID search endpoint (GET /dids/ /dids/search). Attacker-controlled filter keys and values are interpolated directly into sqlalchemy.text via Python str.format, completely bypassing parameterization. This enables full database compromise including extraction of authentication tokens, password hashes, and all managed data identifiers. The vulnerability is affecting deployments using the default metadata plugin configuration jsonmeta with Oracle database backends.

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Details

The vulnerability exists in lib/rucio/core/didmetaplugins/filterengine.py within the createsqlaquery() method. When the database dialect is Oracle, filter expressions for JSON metadata columns are constructed using text() with Python string formatting:

Weakness type: CWE-89.

Product: rucio (PyPI) · Assigned by: GitHub_M · Published: 2026-05-06

Affected and fixed versions

Severity scores

• Attack vector: network (remotely reachable)
• Attack complexity: low
• Attack requirements: none
• Privileges required: low (any account)
• User interaction: none

CVSS measures how bad a flaw is if exploited, not how likely exploitation is. Read it next to the exploitation data below.

Exploitation and urgency

• CISA KEV: not listed (no confirmed in-the-wild exploitation known to CISA).
• CISA SSVC assessment: exploitation none, automatable no, technical impact total.
• FIRST EPSS (model of 2026-10-21): 0.52% probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 43.

Timeline

• 2026-05-06 — CVE record last updated
• 2026-05-06 — CVE record published by GitHub_M
• 2026-05-06 — GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-vjr5-c9qv-hgm3 published (critical)

Sources and references

Original sources first. Version and fix details should always be confirmed against the vendor or project advisory.

Vulnerability records

1. GitHub Advisory GHSA-vjr5-c9qv-hgm3 github.com
2. CVE.org record CVE-2026-29080 cve.org
3. NVD entry CVE-2026-29080 nvd.nist.gov

Other references from the CVE record and advisory

1. github.com github.com
2. github.com github.com
3. github.com github.com
4. pypi.org pypi.org

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