CVE-2026-41328: Dgraph: Pre-Auth Full Database Exfiltration via DQL Injection in NQuad Lang Field

Should you act?

Critical and remotely reachable

No known exploitation yet, but it is network-reachable without credentials. This signal is computed from CISA KEV, EPSS and CVSS data; it is not an editorial verdict.

• Not in CISA KEV, but CISA’s SSVC assessment records a public proof-of-concept, so attack code exists.
• EPSS 0.5%, percentile 40: FIRST’s model estimates a 0.5% chance of exploitation activity in the next 30 days, higher than 40% of all scored CVEs (low). EPSS is a probability, not a verdict.
• Remotely reachable with no login and no user interaction. If the vulnerable service is exposed to the internet, prioritize it.
• Only applies if your dependency tree includes github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v25 (Go) < 25.3.3, fixed in 25.3.3; github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v24 (Go) <= 24.1.8, no fixed version listed; github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph (Go) <= 1.2.8, no fixed version listed. Check your lockfile, including transitive dependencies.

What it is

Dgraph is an open source distributed GraphQL database. Prior to 25.3.3, a vulnerability has been found in Dgraph that gives an unauthenticated attacker full read access to every piece of data in the database. This affects Dgraph's default configuration where ACL is not enabled. The attack requires two HTTP POSTs to port 8080. The first sets up a schema predicate with @unique @index(exact) @lang via /alter (also unauthenticated in default config). The second sends a crafted JSON mutation to /mutate?commitNow=true where a JSON key contains the predicate name followed by @ and a DQL injection payload in the language tag position. The injection exploits the addQueryIfUnique function in edgraph/server.go, which constructs DQL queries using fmt.Sprintf with unsanitized predicateName that includes the raw pred.Lang value. The Lang field is extracted from JSON mutation keys by x.PredicateLang(), which splits on @, and is never validated by any function in the codebase. The attacker injects a closing parenthesis to escape the eq() function, adds an arbitrary named query block, and uses a # comment to neutralize trailing template syntax. The injected query executes server-side and its results are returned in the HTTP response. This vulnerability is fixed in 25.3.3.

From the GitHub advisory

1. Executive Summary

A vulnerability has been found in Dgraph that gives an unauthenticated attacker full read access to every piece of data in the database. This affects Dgraph's default configuration where ACL is not enabled.

The attack requires two HTTP POSTs to port 8080. The first sets up a schema predicate with @unique @index(exact) @lang via /alter (also unauthenticated in default config). The second sends a crafted JSON mutation to /mutate?commitNow=true where a JSON key contains the predicate name followed by @ and a DQL injection payload in the language tag position.

The injection exploits the addQueryIfUnique function in edgraph/server.go, which constructs DQL queries using fmt.Sprintf with unsanitized predicateName that includes the raw pred.Lang value. The Lang field is extracted from JSON mutation keys by x.PredicateLang(), which splits on @, and is never validated by any function in the codebase. The attacker injects a closing parenthesis to escape the eq() function, adds an arbitrary named query block, and uses a # comment to neutralize trailing template syntax. The injected query executes server-side and its results are returned in the HTTP response.

POC clip:

Weakness type: CWE-943.

Product: github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v25 (Go) · Assigned by: GitHub_M · Published: 2026-04-24

Affected and fixed versions

Severity scores

• Attack vector: network (remotely reachable)
• Attack complexity: low
• Privileges required: none (no login)
• User interaction: none
• Scope: unchanged

CVSS measures how bad a flaw is if exploited, not how likely exploitation is. Read it next to the exploitation data below.

Exploitation and urgency

• CISA KEV: not listed (no confirmed in-the-wild exploitation known to CISA).
• CISA SSVC assessment: exploitation poc, automatable yes, technical impact total.
• FIRST EPSS (model of 2026-10-21): 0.48% probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 40.

Timeline

• 2026-04-24 — CVE record last updated
• 2026-04-24 — CVE record published by GitHub_M
• 2026-04-24 — GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-x92x-px7w-4gx4 published (critical)

Sources and references

Original sources first. Version and fix details should always be confirmed against the vendor or project advisory.

Vulnerability records

1. GitHub Advisory GHSA-x92x-px7w-4gx4 github.com
2. CVE.org record CVE-2026-41328 cve.org
3. NVD entry CVE-2026-41328 nvd.nist.gov

Other references from the CVE record and advisory

1. github.com github.com

Critical Go advisories · Today’s Security Digest