CVE-2026-44336: PraisonAI MCP `tools/call` path-traversal => RCE via Python `.pth` injection

Should you act?

Critical and remotely reachable

No known exploitation yet, but it is network-reachable without credentials. This signal is computed from CISA KEV, EPSS and CVSS data; it is not an editorial verdict.

• Not in CISA KEV, but CISA’s SSVC assessment records a public proof-of-concept, so attack code exists.
• EPSS 0.7%, percentile 52: FIRST’s model estimates a 0.7% chance of exploitation activity in the next 30 days, higher than 52% of all scored CVEs (moderate). EPSS is a probability, not a verdict.
• Only applies if your dependency tree includes PraisonAI (PyPI) <= 4.6.33, fixed in 4.6.34. Check your lockfile, including transitive dependencies.

What it is

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.6.34, PraisonAI's MCP (Model Context Protocol) server (praisonai mcp serve) registers four file-handling tools by default — praisonai.rules.create, praisonai.rules.show, praisonai.rules.delete, and praisonai.workflow.show. Each accepts a path or filename string from MCP tools/call arguments and joins it onto ~/.praison/rules/ (or, for workflow.show, accepts an absolute path) with no containment check. The JSON-RPC dispatcher passes params["arguments"] blind to each handler via kwargs without validating against the advertised input schema. By setting rulename="../../ " an attacker walks out of the rules directory and writes any file the running user can write. Dropping a Python .pth file into the user site-packages directory escalates this primitive to arbitrary code execution in any subsequent Python process the user spawns — the next praisonai CLI invocation, an IDE script run, the user's python REPL, or any background Python service. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.34.

From the GitHub advisory

Summary

PraisonAI's MCP (Model Context Protocol) server (praisonai mcp serve) registers four file-handling tools by default — praisonai.rules.create, praisonai.rules.show, praisonai.rules.delete, and praisonai.workflow.show. Each accepts a path or filename string from MCP tools/call arguments and joins it onto ~/.praison/rules/ (or, for workflow.show, accepts an absolute path) with no containment check. The JSON-RPC dispatcher passes params["arguments"] blind to each handler via kwargs without validating against the advertised input schema.

By setting rulename="../../ " an attacker walks out of the rules directory and writes any file the running user can write. Dropping a Python .pth file into the user site-packages directory escalates this primitive to arbitrary code execution in any subsequent Python process the user spawns — the next praisonai CLI invocation, an IDE script run, the user's python REPL, or any background Python service. The same primitive is reachable from:

- An MCP-connected LLM (Claude Desktop, Cursor, Continue.dev, Claude Code) whose context is poisoned by attacker-controlled web content / documents / emails — no operator click required beyond ordinary "ask the LLM to summarise this page" usage. - praisonai mcp serve --transport http-stream with no --api-key (default), reachable from any local process / DNS-rebound browser tab / container neighbour sharing loopback. - Stdio MCP from any prompt-injection vector that reaches the connected LLM.

No operator misconfiguration is required. No env var, flag, or config switch disables the vulnerable handlers.

Weakness type: CWE-20, CWE-22, CWE-94, CWE-829, CWE-913.

Product: PraisonAI (PyPI) · Assigned by: GitHub_M · Published: 2026-05-08

Affected and fixed versions

Severity scores

• Attack vector: network (remotely reachable)
• Attack complexity: low
• Attack requirements: none
• Privileges required: none (no login)
• User interaction: passive

CVSS measures how bad a flaw is if exploited, not how likely exploitation is. Read it next to the exploitation data below.

Exploitation and urgency

• CISA KEV: not listed (no confirmed in-the-wild exploitation known to CISA).
• CISA SSVC assessment: exploitation poc, automatable no, technical impact total.
• FIRST EPSS (model of 2026-10-21): 0.67% probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 52.

Timeline

• 2026-05-08 — CVE record published by GitHub_M
• 2026-05-11 — CVE record last updated
• 2026-05-11 — GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-9mqq-jqxf-grvw published (critical)

Sources and references

Original sources first. Version and fix details should always be confirmed against the vendor or project advisory.

Vulnerability records

1. GitHub Advisory GHSA-9mqq-jqxf-grvw github.com
2. CVE.org record CVE-2026-44336 cve.org
3. NVD entry CVE-2026-44336 nvd.nist.gov

Other references from the CVE record and advisory

1. github.com github.com

Critical PyPI advisories · Today’s Security Digest