CVE-2026-47407: PraisonAI Platform has a cross-workspace IDOR + member-role privilege escalation

Should you act?

Critical, preconditions apply

Severe if exploited, but exploitation needs conditions that may not apply to you. This signal is computed from CISA KEV, EPSS and CVSS data; it is not an editorial verdict.

• Not in CISA KEV, but CISA’s SSVC assessment records a public proof-of-concept, so attack code exists.
• EPSS 0.4%, percentile 35: FIRST’s model estimates a 0.4% chance of exploitation activity in the next 30 days, higher than 35% of all scored CVEs (low). EPSS is a probability, not a verdict.
• Needs an account (low (any account)). Exposure depends on who can log in.
• Only applies if your dependency tree includes praisonai-platform (PyPI) <= 0.1.2, fixed in 0.1.4. Check your lockfile, including transitive dependencies.

What it is

PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 0.1.4, the Platform server exposes resources under /api/v1/workspaces/{workspaceid}/... and protects them with a requireworkspacemember(workspaceid) FastAPI dependency. The dependency only checks that the caller is a member of the workspaceid in the URL prefix. The route handlers then look up the inner resource (agentid, issueid, projectid, labelid, commentid, dependencyid) by primary key alone. The resource's own workspaceid is never compared to the URL's workspaceid. A user can therefore put their own workspace in the URL prefix and any other workspace's resource ID in the path. The auth check passes, since they really are a member of the prefix workspace. The service then returns the cross-tenant resource for read, update, or delete. There is a second bug in the member-management routes (addmember, updatememberrole, removemember, updateworkspace, deleteworkspace). Each one inherits the default minrole="member" from requireworkspacemember. Any basic member can therefore promote themselves to admin or owner, demote or remove other members, and delete the workspace. The role hierarchy exists in the schema but is not enforced. Registration is open at /api/v1/auth/register with no email verification. The default server bind is 0.0.0.0:8000 (python -m praisonaiplatform). One curl from any unauthenticated network position is enough to bootstrap into the system. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.

From the GitHub advisory

Summary

The Platform server exposes resources under /api/v1/workspaces/{workspaceid}/... and protects them with a requireworkspacemember(workspaceid) FastAPI dependency. The dependency only checks that the caller is a member of the workspaceid in the URL prefix. The route handlers then look up the inner resource (agentid, issueid, projectid, labelid, commentid, dependencyid) by primary key alone. The resource's own workspaceid is never compared to the URL's workspaceid.

A user can therefore put their own workspace in the URL prefix and any other workspace's resource ID in the path. The auth check passes, since they really are a member of the prefix workspace. The service then returns the cross-tenant resource for read, update, or delete.

There is a second bug in the member-management routes (addmember, updatememberrole, removemember, updateworkspace, deleteworkspace). Each one inherits the default minrole="member" from requireworkspacemember. Any basic member can therefore promote themselves to admin or owner, demote or remove other members, and delete the workspace. The role hierarchy exists in the schema but is not enforced.

Registration is open at /api/v1/auth/register with no email verification. The default server bind is 0.0.0.0:8000 (python -m praisonaiplatform). One curl from any unauthenticated network position is enough to bootstrap into the system.

Weakness type: CWE-269, CWE-639, CWE-863.

Product: praisonai-platform (PyPI) · Assigned by: GitHub_M · Published: 2026-07-21

Affected and fixed versions

Severity scores

• Attack vector: network (remotely reachable)
• Attack complexity: low
• Attack requirements: none
• Privileges required: low (any account)
• User interaction: none

CVSS measures how bad a flaw is if exploited, not how likely exploitation is. Read it next to the exploitation data below.

Exploitation and urgency

• CISA KEV: not listed (no confirmed in-the-wild exploitation known to CISA).
• CISA SSVC assessment: exploitation poc, automatable no, technical impact total.
• FIRST EPSS (model of 2026-10-21): 0.41% probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 35.

Timeline

• 2026-05-29 — GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-h8q5-cp56-rr65 published (critical)
• 2026-07-21 — CVE record published by GitHub_M
• 2026-07-22 — CVE record last updated

Sources and references

Original sources first. Version and fix details should always be confirmed against the vendor or project advisory.

Vulnerability records

1. GitHub Advisory GHSA-h8q5-cp56-rr65 github.com
2. CVE.org record CVE-2026-47407 cve.org
3. NVD entry CVE-2026-47407 nvd.nist.gov

Other references from the CVE record and advisory

1. github.com github.com
2. github.com github.com
3. github.com github.com

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