CVE-2026-48205: Apache Camel DNS Has Improper Input Validation, Leading to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Should you act?

Critical and remotely reachable

No known exploitation yet, but it is network-reachable without credentials. This signal is computed from CISA KEV, EPSS and CVSS data; it is not an editorial verdict.

• No confirmed exploitation. It is not in CISA’s KEV catalog and CISA’s SSVC assessment records no known exploitation. That can change quickly after a public write-up; re-check if you are affected.
• EPSS 0.6%, percentile 48: FIRST’s model estimates a 0.6% chance of exploitation activity in the next 30 days, higher than 48% of all scored CVEs (low). EPSS is a probability, not a verdict.
• Remotely reachable with no login and no user interaction. If the vulnerable service is exposed to the internet, prioritize it.
• Only applies if your dependency tree includes org.apache.camel:camel-dns (Maven) >= 4.0.0, < 4.14.8, fixed in 4.14.8; org.apache.camel:camel-dns (Maven) >= 4.15.0, < 4.18.3, fixed in 4.18.3; org.apache.camel:camel-dns (Maven) >= 4.19.0, < 4.21.0, fixed in 4.21.0. Check your lockfile, including transitive dependencies.

What it is

Improper Input Validation, Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Apache Camel DNS component. The camel-dns producers read DNS operation parameters - the resolver to query, the name or domain to look up, the record type and class, and the search term - from Exchange message headers whose constant values (DnsConstants.DNSSERVER, DNSNAME, DNSDOMAIN, DNSTYPE, DNSCLASS, TERM) were the plain strings dns.server, dns.name, dns.domain, dns.type, dns.class and term. Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) into a dns: producer, any HTTP client could therefore set the dns.server header to make the dig producer build a SimpleResolver pointing at an attacker-controlled DNS server - a server-side request forgery via DNS, through which the attacker observes the queried name and can return poisoned responses - and set the dns.name / dns.domain headers to resolve arbitrary internal hostnames, disclosing whether they exist (internal network reconnaissance). No credentials are required when the bridging consumer is unauthenticated. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. After upgrading, routes that drive DNS operations via the raw header names must use CamelDnsServer / CamelDnsName / CamelDnsDomain / CamelDnsType / CamelDnsClass / CamelDnsTerm instead of the dns. / term names. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the dns. and term headers from any untrusted ingress before the dns: producer, and set the DNS server and lookup parameters from a trusted source in the route.

From the GitHub advisory

Improper Input Validation, Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Apache Camel DNS component.

The camel-dns producers read DNS operation parameters - the resolver to query, the name or domain to look up, the record type and class, and the search term - from Exchange message headers whose constant values (DnsConstants.DNSSERVER, DNSNAME, DNSDOMAIN, DNSTYPE, DNSCLASS, TERM) were the plain strings dns.server, dns.name, dns.domain, dns.type, dns.class and term. Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) into a dns: producer, any HTTP client could therefore set the dns.server header to make the dig producer build a SimpleResolver pointing at an attacker-controlled DNS server - a server-side request forgery via DNS, through which the attacker observes the queried name and can return poisoned responses - and set the dns.name / dns.domain headers to resolve arbitrary internal hostnames, disclosing whether they exist (internal network reconnaissance). No credentials are required when the bridging consumer is unauthenticated.

This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.

Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. After upgrading, routes that drive DNS operations via the raw header names must use CamelDnsServer / CamelDnsName / CamelDnsDomain / CamelDnsType / CamelDnsClass / CamelDnsTerm instead of the dns. / term names. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the dns. and term headers from any untrusted ingress before the dns: producer, and set the DNS server and lookup parameters from a trusted source in the route.

Weakness type: CWE-20, CWE-918.

Product: org.apache.camel:camel-dns (Maven) · Assigned by: apache · Published: 2026-07-06

Affected and fixed versions

Severity scores

• Attack vector: network (remotely reachable)
• Attack complexity: low
• Privileges required: none (no login)
• User interaction: none
• Scope: unchanged

CVSS measures how bad a flaw is if exploited, not how likely exploitation is. Read it next to the exploitation data below.

Exploitation and urgency

• CISA KEV: not listed (no confirmed in-the-wild exploitation known to CISA).
• CISA SSVC assessment: exploitation none, automatable yes, technical impact total.
• FIRST EPSS (model of 2026-10-21): 0.60% probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days; percentile 48.

Timeline

• 2026-07-06 — CVE record last updated
• 2026-07-06 — CVE record published by apache
• 2026-07-06 — GitHub-reviewed advisory GHSA-hcm8-x79p-wx2w published (critical)

Sources and references

Original sources first. Version and fix details should always be confirmed against the vendor or project advisory.

Vendor and project advisories, patches

1. camel.apache.org camel.apache.org

Vulnerability records

1. GitHub Advisory GHSA-hcm8-x79p-wx2w github.com
2. CVE.org record CVE-2026-48205 cve.org
3. NVD entry CVE-2026-48205 nvd.nist.gov

Other references from the CVE record and advisory

1. openwall.com openwall.com
2. github.com github.com
3. issues.apache.org issues.apache.org

Critical Maven advisories · Today’s Security Digest