Security Digest · Nov 12, 2026 · Vulnerability · Network edge
Check Point Gaia: Exploited Root Escalation via DynamicCLI
CVE-2026-123039 gives root on Check Point gateways; chained with PHP2Shell in attacks on two dozen customers. Fixed in Nov Jumbo takes. In KEV. Act now.
Our verdict
Act now
On its own this is a local bug, but attackers are already chaining it with PHP2Shell on gateway web portals to get root, plant backdoors and in some cases wipe ESXi hosts, so Check Point Force Firewall owners should install the November Jumbo take now and hunt for compromise.
Who must act: Anyone running Check Point Force Firewalls, Management or Log Servers, Multi-Domain servers or Maestro Orchestrators on R81 through R82.20, and especially gateways with the Mobile Access portal, SSL Network Extender, SAML, Captive Portal, UserCheck or Zero Phishing enabled.
Who can relax: Check Point Spark Firewall and Smart-1 Cloud customers, whom Check Point lists as unaffected by this flaw, and organizations that do not run Check Point products.
- Affected
- Check Point R82.20 below Jumbo Hotfix Take 14
Check Point R82.10 below Jumbo Hotfix Take 52
Check Point R82 below Jumbo Hotfix Take 132
Check Point R81.20 below Jumbo Hotfix Take 174
Check Point R81.10 and R81 (end of support; no fix listed) - Fixed in
- R82.20 Jumbo Hotfix Take 14
R82.10 Jumbo Hotfix Take 52
R82 Jumbo Hotfix Take 132
R81.20 Jumbo Hotfix Take 174 - CVSS
- 7.8 (v3.1, CNA)
- EPSS
- 100.0% (percentile 100.0)
- CISA KEV
- Yes, listed as known exploited
- Exploitation
- Exploited in the wild
- Severity
- High
What to do
- Install the fixed Jumbo Hotfix take (R82.20 Take 14, R82.10 Take 52, R82 Take 132, R81.20 Take 174) on every gateway, cluster member, management and log server.
- If you cannot patch today, stop the daemon with dbset process:dynamic_server followed by dbset :save, accepting that Dynamic CLI commands will fail.
- Confirm the PHP2Shell fix from sk1000302 is also in place on any gateway with Mobile Access, SSL Network Extender, SAML, Captive Portal, UserCheck or Zero Phishing; the same Jumbo takes cover it.
- Run Check Point's IOC greps against /var/log/dynamicCli.log on every member and search for the files and IPs in Check Point Research's report.
- Treat any gateway with indicators as compromised: rebuild it, rotate its VPN, admin and certificate secrets, and check ESXi and other hosts it can reach.
- Plan an upgrade off R81.10 and R81, which get no fix.
How to check if you are affected or compromised
- In Expert mode, ls -l /tmp/dynamic_socket: srwxrwxrwx (0777) means unpatched; patched systems show srw-rw---- root config (0660).
- grep -F "Received = #return_value#" /var/log/dynamicCli.log and grep for commands such as whoami, /etc/shadow, nc, curl, wget, base64, useradd and authorized_keys in Received entries.
- Look for zz*.tpl files in the portal templates directory, /tmp/.up.tpl, /tmp/CPconfigdaemon, /lib/libcpfwcommon.so and /tmp/.p_sock.
- Search firewall and proxy logs for 130.94.19[.]204 and 130.94.19[.]168, and for traffic on TCP 11072.
- On reachable ESXi hosts, look for SSH logins as vpxuser from the gateway and for DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt files.
What happened#
On November 12, 2026, Check Point published sk1000362 for CVE-2026-123039, a local privilege escalation in Gaia OS. The DynamicCLI daemon (dynamic_server) runs as root and listens on /tmp/dynamic_socket. That socket is world-writable (0777) and does not authenticate the processes that connect to it, so the daemon runs any command string it receives. Any local user, including a low-privilege service account, can send a command and have it executed as root. Check Point rates it CVSS 3.1 7.8 and says it has "observed an active exploit of this vulnerability against a couple of dozen customers."
The same day, Check Point Research described how attackers got the local foothold. They used PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619), the PHP engine bugs patched upstream on October 21, against the gateway's Mobile Access portal. That gave them code execution as the portal service account, and CVE-2026-123039 took them to root. Activity began on October 30, about a week after Check Point shipped its PHP2Shell hotfix. The first wave hit Israeli organizations, some of them destructively. A second wave from November 2 hit organizations in several countries and sectors with no destructive activity seen.
After rooting the gateways, the attackers planted zz*.tpl webshells in the portal templates. They installed an implant Check Point calls TSGA (/tmp/CPconfigdaemon), which provides remote access, configuration theft and firewall-log tampering, plus a proxy library called TSProxy (/lib/libcpfwcommon.so) and the gogo internal scanner. In at least one case they moved over SSH as vpxuser to a VMware ESXi host and ran a wiper, destroy_v6, which leaves a DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt note. Check Point links TSGA and TSProxy to tooling ESET tied to China-nexus UNC5221, but does not attribute the campaign with high confidence.
CISA added CVE-2026-123039 to the KEV catalog on November 13. It gave federal agencies until November 16 and requires forensic triage under BOD 26-04.
Who is affected#
Per sk1000362, the root-escalation bug affects Force Firewalls, Management and Log Servers, Multi-Domain Security Management and Multi-Domain Log Servers, and Maestro Orchestrators on R82.20, R82.10, R82, R81.20, R81.10 and R81. Spark Firewalls and Smart-1 Cloud are not affected. R81.10 and R81 are end of support and get no fix.
The PHP2Shell entry point is narrower. sk1000302 says a gateway is exposed only if it uses the Mobile Access portal, Remote Access VPN with SSL Network Extender or SAML authentication, the Identity Awareness Captive Portal, the UserCheck portal, or Zero Phishing. Management and Log Servers are not exposed to PHP2Shell.
Do you really need to act?#
Yes, if you run Check Point gateways. CVSS 7.8 and "local" undersell this. The local precondition is exactly what PHP2Shell provides from the internet on gateways with web portals enabled, and the two have been chained in real intrusions for more than two weeks. A rooted firewall hands over VPN traffic, configuration and credentials, plus a pivot inward; here, to ESXi.
The fix is convenient: the same Jumbo takes fix both bugs (R82.20 Take 14, R82.10 Take 52, R82 Take 132, R81.20 Take 174). Management servers are not exposed to PHP2Shell but still carry the root bug; patch them too.
What to do now#
- Check the installed take on each member with
cpinfo -y allin Expert mode, then install the fixed Jumbo Hotfix take on gateways, cluster members, management and log servers. - If you cannot patch immediately, disable the daemon as sk1000362 describes:
dbset process:dynamic_serverthendbset :save. Confirm withps auxw | grep -v grep | grep 'dynamic_server'. Dynamic CLI commands (sk144112) will stop working. Re-enable later withdbset process:dynamic_server tanddbset :save. - On gateways that are still unpatched, apply the sk1000302 workaround or hotfix, which blocks multipart requests in
$CPDIR/web/Apache/conf/cp-httpd.conf. Otherwise disable the affected portals until you can patch. - Hunt before you declare yourself clean (next section). A patch does not remove a backdoor installed since October 30.
- If you find indicators, rebuild the gateway from known-good media, rotate admin, VPN, certificate and pre-shared secrets, and investigate ESXi and internal hosts the gateway could reach.
How to tell if you were hit#
Check the socket first. In Expert mode, ls -l /tmp/dynamic_socket shows srwxrwxrwx on unpatched systems and srw-rw---- root config when fixed. Then run Check Point's greps on every member. grep -F "Received = #return_value#" /var/log/dynamicCli.log finds use of the system() sink, which is rare in legitimate traffic. Next, look for Received = lines that lack the normal CPprofile.sh Clish wrapper, and lines containing whoami, /etc/shadow, nc -, /dev/tcp, curl, wget, base64, useradd or authorized_keys. On patched systems, "Rejected connection from unauthorized uid" in the same log marks a blocked attempt.
From Check Point Research, look for zz*.tpl webshells, /tmp/.up.tpl, /tmp/CPconfigdaemon, /tmp/.bd.log, /lib/libcpfwcommon.so, /tmp/.p_sock and session artifacts containing upload_progress_pwn under /opt/CPcvpn-R81.20/tmp/. The report also lists hashes, the IPs 130.94.19[.]204 and 130.94.19[.]168, and TCP port 11072.
Timeline#
- — PHP fixes PHP2Shell upstream; Check Point opens sk1000302.
- — Check Point releases PHP2Shell hotfixes for its gateways.
- — First wave of PHP2Shell plus root-escalation attacks on Check Point gateways, focused on Israel, with destructive activity.
- — Second, global wave begins, with no destruction observed.
- — sk1000362 created.
- — Check Point publishes CVE-2026-123039, fixed Jumbo takes and the research report.
- — CISA adds CVE-2026-123039 to KEV, with a federal deadline of Nov 16.
Vulnerability records
- CVE-2026-123039 · KEV 2026-11-13 · The Gaia OS DynamicCLI daemon runs as root and listens on a world-writable local socket (/tmp/dynamic_socket) without authenticating connecting processes.
- CVE-2026-109618 · KEV 2026-10-26 · PHP uses longjmp() for out-of-memory (OOM) errors to exit the current context and abort handling of the request.
- CVE-2026-109619 · KEV 2026-10-26 · PHP has various global state that temporarily points into request memory.
Sources
Original sources first: vendor and project advisories, CVE and government records, the discoverers’ write-ups. Every claim above links to one of these. See how the Security Desk works.
Original and primary sources
- Check Point — sk1000362: Local privilege escalation to root in the DynamicCLI process (CVE-2026-123039) support.checkpoint.com
- Check Point Research — PHP2Shell exploitation on Check Point Gateway research.checkpoint.com
- Check Point — sk1000302: Check Point response to CVE-2026-109618, CVE-2026-109619 and CVE-2026-115560 support.checkpoint.com
- CISA — Known Exploited Vulnerabilities: CVE-2026-123039 cisa.gov
- NVD — CVE-2026-123039 nvd.nist.gov
Coverage and analysis
- BleepingComputer — Check Point warns of zero-day flaw exploited for root access bleepingcomputer.com