Security Digest · Nov 12, 2026 · Supply-chain compromise · CI/CD

wfx-loot: Hijacked GitHub Accounts Run CI Secret Stealer

Stolen GitHub credentials for 4,837 accounts pushed a CI secret stealer that ran in 1,806+ repositories since Nov 10. Search your orgs for the probe PR today.

Our verdict

Check exposure

Most organizations were not touched, but the check takes minutes and a hit means every secret and cloud role your workflows can reach is compromised, with cloud backdoors that survive rotation.

Who must act: Any organization or maintainer with a 'docs: dependency audit notes' pull request, a wfx-docs branch or the listed commit messages in a repository since November 10, 2026, and anyone who ran npm install on an affected commit.

Who can relax: Teams whose organizations show none of the indicators after a search across all repositories and branches, and consumers of packages other than the two named below.

Affected
GitHub repositories writable by 4,837 compromised accounts (61,764 repositories probed)
Packagist digitalelvis/neuronai-studio 3.14.3
Go github.com/onuragtas/docker-env v1.0.278 and v1.0.280 (payload only in a workflow file)
Fixed in
No central fix; GitHub takedown not announced as of 2026-11-12
Pin digitalelvis/neuronai-studio 3.14.2 or earlier
CVSS
Not scored
EPSS
n/a
CISA KEV
Not listed
Exploitation
Exploited in the wild
Severity
High

What to do

  1. Search every organization for the probe: gh search prs "docs: dependency audit notes" --owner <org> --created ">=2026-11-10".
  2. For any account that opened a probe PR, revoke sessions, personal access tokens, OAuth grants (including GitHub CLI) and SSH keys, then reset the password.
  3. For any repository where a payload commit landed, rotate every Actions secret and variable, registry token, cloud key and AI provider key its workflows could read.
  4. Remove cloud persistence: AWS role trust policies set to Principal AWS "*", IAM access keys created since November 10, and Azure federated credentials named wfx-ci-*.
  5. Close the probe PRs, delete wfx-docs, chore/* and ci-check-* attacker branches, and confirm the revert removed the payload.
  6. Require code-owner review for .github/workflows and package.json, and set the default GITHUB_TOKEN permission to read-only.

How to check if you are affected or compromised

  • In each clone: git log --all --since=2026-11-10 --format='%h %ad %an %s' | grep -E 'ci: refresh build cache|chore: add ci helper|chore: add dependency audit workflow|ci: restore|ci: cleanup'.
  • Look for gaps in workflow run numbers next to those commits; the actor deletes the run and its logs, so a missing run number may be the only trace.
  • Search egress logs from runners for 194.150.166[.]244:8080 and 18.143.168[.]96:8080.
  • In AWS CloudTrail since November 10, review CreateAccessKey, UpdateAssumeRolePolicy and AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity from the GitHub OIDC provider; in Entra audit logs, review federated credential additions.
  • Search package.json files for a postinstall hook that runs .ci-[a-z0-9]{6}.sh.

What happened#

Starting at about 12:45 UTC on November 10, 2026, an attacker used stolen GitHub credentials to push a secret-stealing payload into repositories those accounts could write to. Aikido, which disclosed the campaign on November 12 and tracks it as wfx-loot, counted 4,837 compromised accounts that opened probe pull requests in 61,764 repositories. The payload ran and exfiltrated credentials in at least 1,806 of them (Aikido's post also gives 1,835 in one place).

The pattern is consistent. The account opens a pull request titled docs: dependency audit notes from a branch named wfx-docs to confirm write access. The payload then arrives in one of three forms:

  • a commit ci: refresh build cache that adds about 1,500 lines to an existing workflow;
  • a commit chore: add ci helper that adds a hidden .ci-xxxxxx.sh script and an npm postinstall hook;
  • a commit chore: add dependency audit workflow that adds .github/workflows/build-audit-xxxxxx.yml on a throwaway chore/xxxxxxxx branch.

The actor then reverts the change and deletes the workflow run and its logs. Aikido observed reverts within a minute; The Hacker News reports a second analysis by SafeDep that found some changes left in place longer, a third exfiltration server and a Telegram channel.

The script collects Actions secrets and variables, the GITHUB_TOKEN, OIDC and runtime tokens, cloud and registry credential files, AI provider keys, and secrets from runner process memory. It then uses what it found: it exchanges GitHub OIDC tokens for AWS, GCP and Azure sessions, creates long-lived IAM access keys, rewrites AWS role trust policies to "Principal": {"AWS": "*"}, and adds Azure federated credentials named wfx-ci-… that point back at the repository. It also posts forged success status checks under the names of the repository's required checks.

How the credentials were stolen is not confirmed as of November 12, 2026. Endor Labs notes one victim who reported a leaked GitHub CLI OAuth token. Aikido says the accounts overlap heavily with October's GhostAction campaign but assesses the two as different actors. No statement from GitHub was found in any source reviewed.

Who is affected#

Anyone who owns, or collaborates on, a repository one of the 4,837 accounts could write to. Of the probe PRs, 10,431 went into repositories the account does not own, reached through collaborator or organization access, so one compromised contributor is enough. Endor Labs documents commits pushed under the WebdriverIO bot account on November 11 at 12:11 UTC, flagged by a contributor within about 20 minutes.

Two published package versions carry the payload: Packagist digitalelvis/neuronai-studio 3.14.3, and Go github.com/onuragtas/docker-env v1.0.278 and v1.0.280. In the Go module the payload sits only in a workflow file, which Go builds do not run. The Hacker News, citing SafeDep, puts the number of repositories that received the npm postinstall variant at 771; those run the script on any machine that installs from the affected commit.

Do you really need to act?#

You need to check. You probably do not need to do more. 4,837 accounts is a small share of GitHub, and the payload ran in a fraction of the repositories probed.

If you do find a hit, do not treat it as a routine secret leak. Three things make it worse than usual:

  • A probe PR means the account is compromised, even if no payload followed.
  • Absence of evidence is weak. The run and logs are deleted, and the artifact, cache and step-summary channels were disabled in this campaign, so finding no wfx-loot artifact proves nothing.
  • Rotation alone is not enough. The AWS trust policy rewrite and Azure federated credentials are designed to keep working after tokens are rotated.

The stealer contains settings for private repositories, so do not limit the search to public ones.

What to do now#

  1. Search for the probe across each organization: gh search prs "docs: dependency audit notes" --owner <org> --created ">=2026-11-10".
  2. Check for attacker branches: git ls-remote origin 'refs/heads/wfx-docs' 'refs/heads/chore/*' 'refs/heads/ci-check-*'.
  3. For every account behind a probe PR, revoke sessions, tokens, OAuth grants and SSH keys, and reset the password with phishing-resistant MFA.
  4. For every repository where a payload commit landed, rotate all secrets its workflows could read: repository and organization secrets, cloud keys, npm, PyPI, Packagist and crates tokens, and AI provider keys.
  5. Remove cloud persistence: trust policies allowing any AWS principal, IAM keys created since November 10, and wfx-ci-* federated credentials on Azure app registrations.
  6. Close the probe PRs, delete the attacker branches, and review status checks on the attacker's commits.
  7. Remove the two affected package versions; treat a machine that installed the Packagist version as compromised.

How to tell if you were hit#

Search commit history on all branches for the five commit messages: ci: refresh build cache, chore: add ci helper, chore: add dependency audit workflow, ci: restore and ci: cleanup. A gap in workflow run numbers beside one of those commits indicates a deleted run. On the network side, look for runner traffic to 194.150.166[.]244:8080 or 18.143.168[.]96:8080. The stealer script's SHA-256 is 89695abb392d5cfd4972672961e644bb46baa98aa1ed7173c2a2816c762735cf.

In AWS CloudTrail, review CreateAccessKey, UpdateAssumeRolePolicy and AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity from the GitHub OIDC provider since November 10. In Entra audit logs, review federated credential additions.

Timeline#

  • — First probe PRs at about 12:45 UTC.
  • — First victim report at 06:33 UTC citing a leaked GitHub CLI token; WebdriverIO repositories hit at 12:11 UTC and reverted by 12:30.
  • — Aikido publishes its analysis; Endor Labs follows. The Hacker News reports new probe PRs opened that morning between 05:04 and 05:38 UTC. No takedown announced.

Sources

Original sources first: vendor and project advisories, CVE and government records, the discoverers’ write-ups. Every claim above links to one of these. See how the Security Desk works.

Original and primary sources

  1. Aikido — wfx-loot campaign pushes CI secret stealer to tens of thousands of repositories aikido.dev
  2. Endor Labs — Hijacked GitHub Accounts Push wfx CI Secret Stealer to Thousands of Repositories endorlabs.com
  3. Cyberpress — GitHub Supply Chain Attack Exposes Developer Secrets as Malicious Workflows Execute Across 1,806 Repositories cyberpress.org

Coverage and analysis

  1. The Hacker News — Attacker Used 4,837 Hijacked GitHub Accounts to Run a CI Secret Stealer in 1,806+ Repositories thehackernews.com