Security Digest · Nov 11, 2026 · Vulnerability · Other
SCKit: ScreenConnect RMM+ Extension Abused to Hit MSPs
Attackers used the third-party RMM+ ScreenConnect extension (CVE-2026-127063) to push rogue clients to MSP endpoints. Disable it and hunt for SCKit.
Our verdict
Act now
If your ScreenConnect server has an RMM+ family extension installed, disable it now and hunt for rogue clients; attacks on on-premises servers were still being seen on November 16.
Who must act: MSPs and IT teams running on-premises ScreenConnect with Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+ or the Password Link extensions installed, and anyone whose technician clients are older than 26.6.5.
Who can relax: ScreenConnect users who never installed an RMM+ family extension and whose technician clients run 26.6.5 or later; the CVE record says the ScreenConnect server and client are not affected by the extension flaw.
- Affected
- Third-party RMM+ extension for ScreenConnect: the CVE record lists all extension versions where the default API secret was kept; Huntress saw abuse of versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32
About 400 ScreenConnect partner environments had at least one RMM+ family extension installed, per ConnectWise
ScreenConnect technician clients before 26.6.5 (CVE-2026-84869), which SCKit tries to use to spread to technicians - Fixed in
- No fixed RMM+ extension version disclosed as of Nov 17, 2026; ConnectWise says keep the extensions disabled and do not reinstall them
ScreenConnect client 26.6.5 or later fixes CVE-2026-84869
ScreenConnect Cloud: ConnectWise disabled the extensions itself; on-premises partners must do it - CVSS
- 9.3 (v4.0, CNA)
- EPSS
- 1.2% (percentile 68)
- CISA KEV
- Yes, listed as known exploited
- Exploitation
- Exploited in the wild
- Severity
- Critical
What to do
- On on-premises ScreenConnect, disable Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link and RMM+ Password Link, and do not re-enable or reinstall them until ConnectWise says so.
- Update the on-premises server to the latest supported version and confirm every technician client runs 26.6.5 or later.
- Review Run Command and Toolbox history for mass actions nobody started, and look for a second ScreenConnect client on endpoints.
- Investigate suspect endpoints with EDR, WinRM or another out-of-band tool, never by connecting to them through ScreenConnect.
- Isolate affected hosts, then remove the rogue client service, the TrapWatch task, C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap and the RelayTrapLiteAlert Run value, preserving evidence first.
- Terminate ScreenConnect web sessions, reset credentials and revoke browser and identity-provider sessions for technicians who touched affected hosts.
How to check if you are affected or compromised
- A Windows service named Windows Update Agent running C:\ProgramData\Windows Update Agent (de362a425905bcc4)\UpdateConnect.ClientService.exe as LocalSystem.
- C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap\, a scheduled task named TrapWatch, or C:\Windows\TEMP\sc.msi, sckit-run.bat or sckit-decoder.ps1.
- Run reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v RelayTrapLiteAlert and netsh interface portproxy show all (a proxy on 127.0.0.1:88 is a second-wave sign).
- Connections to 185.241.211.197, 185.99.255.28 or 155.94.150.39, or unexpected Microsoft Defender exclusions and hosts-file changes.
- ScreenConnect commands reaching many endpoints within minutes with no matching technician login.
What happened#
On November 11, 2026, attackers began pushing commands to Windows machines managed through ConnectWise ScreenConnect, a remote support tool widely used by managed service providers (MSPs). They did not log in to ScreenConnect. According to Huntress, the commands arrived through RMM+, a third-party ScreenConnect extension that bypasses ScreenConnect's user accounts, roles and MFA and relies on a shared access key. In versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32, if an administrator had never set that key, the extension accepted an empty one.
ConnectWise assigned CVE-2026-127063 on November 12, with a CVSS 4.0 score of 9.3. The record describes the flaw slightly differently: the extension "uses a static API secret by default," and environments that kept the default may allow unauthorized access to its API, "including the ability to send commands to managed agents." It lists all extension versions as affected, names DataComm as the vendor, and says the ScreenConnect server and client are not impacted.
The commands, run as SYSTEM, installed an attacker-controlled ScreenConnect client and a toolkit Huntress calls SCKit. Huntress counted 288 hosts across 48 organizations in the first wave, all hit within about 90 minutes, and 205 hosts across 41 organizations in a second wave on November 13 that used new infrastructure. ConnectWise's advisories say about 400 partner environments had at least one RMM+ family extension installed. On November 16 it said its investigation was complete, but that researchers still see activity against on-premises servers where the extensions remain enabled.
Who is affected#
ScreenConnect deployments with one of five extensions installed: Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link and RMM+ Password Link. ConnectWise disabled them in its cloud environments. It cannot do that for on-premises servers, so those partners must act themselves. ConnectWise also notes that having an extension installed does not by itself mean an environment was hit. As a precaution it disabled three more marketplace extensions (ITBoost Integration, RepairShopr Integration and Guest Session Starter) and encourages all partners to do the same.
The downstream risk falls on the MSP's customers, whose machines received the rogue client.
Do you really need to act?#
If an RMM+ family extension was ever installed on your ScreenConnect server, yes, now. No fixed extension version has been announced as of November 17, so the only safe state is disabled.
If you run ScreenConnect without these extensions, the exposure is much narrower. Your remaining job is to confirm technician clients run 26.6.5 or later. SCKit carries a module that tries to exploit CVE-2026-84869, the client flaw fixed in 26.6.5 on September 8, to jump from an infected endpoint to the technician who connects to troubleshoot it. Updating the server alone does not update clients. CVE-2026-84869 is in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog; CVE-2026-127063 was not listed as of November 17. Some honesty about that worm claim: Huntress reconstructed the technique but did not observe it working, and says the console-takeover attempt failed in every host log it recovered. The Hacker News likewise reports no evidence that it succeeded in this campaign.
One more caution from ConnectWise: disabling the extensions and updating do not remove access or persistence already on a device. Cleanup is separate work.
What to do now#
- Disable the five extensions on on-premises servers. Do not re-enable or reinstall them until ConnectWise issues further guidance.
- Update the server to the latest supported version and confirm every technician client is on 26.6.5 or later. Turn off Transfer Files where it is not needed.
- Review Run Command and Toolbox history for mass actions nobody started.
- Triage suspect endpoints with EDR or WinRM. Do not connect to them through ScreenConnect. If a technician already did, treat that workstation as exposed.
- Isolate affected hosts and preserve evidence, then remove the rogue client service, the
TrapWatchscheduled task,C:\ProgramData\RelayTrapand theRelayTrapLiteAlertRun value. Huntress saw reinfection when isolation was lifted before cleanup. - Terminate ScreenConnect web sessions, reset credentials, and revoke browser and identity-provider sessions. The toolkit steals session cookies.
How to tell if you were hit#
On endpoints, look for a second ScreenConnect client. In one incident it was a service named "Windows Update Agent" running UpdateConnect.ClientService.exe from C:\ProgramData\Windows Update Agent (de362a425905bcc4)\ as LocalSystem. Other signs:
C:\Windows\TEMP\sc.msi,sckit-run.batorsckit-decoder.ps1inC:\Windows\Temp.reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v RelayTrapLiteAlertreturns a value.netsh interface portproxy show alllists a proxy on127.0.0.1:88, seen in the second wave, or the hosts file has changed.- New Microsoft Defender exclusions, or traffic to
185.241.211.197,185.99.255.28or155.94.150.39.
Huntress notes that the scripts are rebuilt per host, so file hashes are weak indicators. Match on paths, service names and behavior.
Timeline#
- — ScreenConnect 26.6.5 fixes CVE-2026-84869.
- — First wave from about 17:47 UTC: 288 hosts across 48 organizations. ConnectWise publishes an advisory at 22:45 UTC and disables the extensions in cloud environments.
- — CVE-2026-127063 published for the RMM+ extension.
- — Second wave: 205 hosts across 41 organizations. ConnectWise disables three more extensions as a precaution.
- — ConnectWise says its investigation is complete and that attacks on on-premises servers with the extensions enabled continue.
Vulnerability records
- CVE-2026-127063 · The third-party RMM+ extension for ConnectWise ScreenConnect uses a static API secret by default.
- CVE-2026-84869 · KEV 2026-09-11 · A condition in the ScreenConnect client may allow files to be transferred and executed through an active remote session without authorization or Host…
Sources
Original sources first: vendor and project advisories, CVE and government records, the discoverers’ write-ups. Every claim above links to one of these. See how the Security Desk works.
Original and primary sources
- CVE record — CVE-2026-127063 (RMM+ extension static default API secret) cve.org
- ConnectWise — Trust Center advisories (ScreenConnect extension investigation, Nov 11–16, 2026) connectwise.com
- ConnectWise — ScreenConnect 26.6.5 Security Patch (CVE-2026-84869) connectwise.com
- Huntress — SCKit worm: rogue ScreenConnect clients and session cookie relays huntress.com